A new report from the Department of Defense Inspector General found that the Air Force did not seek restitution for 45 defective spare parts worth $5.9 million for the C-130J Super Hercules, because Air Force deficiency reporting personnel did not enforce the warranty for those parts, did not have an effective system for tracking those parts, and did not fully understand the warranty requirements.

Beyond the C-130J, the Air Force also could not provide evidence of contractor restitution for 77 defective parts valued at $500,000 for other airframes, including the F-16, F-22, and even the device which arms certain kinds of bomb fuzes. 

While the Air Force was paid back for 185 other defective parts valued at $19.4 million, it took an average of 81 days to provide evidence of contractor restitution, leading the watchdog to question the service’s process for holding contractors responsible. Restitution could take the form of payment, repaired parts, or replacement parts.

“These conditions occurred because the Air Force lacked adequate guidance and controls over the contractor restitution portion of its deficiency reporting process,” investigators wrote. “As a result, the Air Force missed opportunities to hold contractors accountable and obtain restitution for defective parts.”

It’s not just a matter of returning taxpayer money; when parts are bad, they put lives at risk. In 2020, an F-16 pilot died when his ejection seat failed to deploy its parachute. Air Force investigators suspected some key parts of the seat may have been counterfeit.

“The Air Force’s official inquiry in the months following the accident found that electronics inside the seat were scratched, unevenly sanded, and showed otherwise shoddy craftsmanship,” Air Force Times reported in 2022.

The DODIG investigation found reports of many other defective aircraft parts, including hazy F-16 cockpit canopies; inadequate fuel tubes for an F-16 engine; flaps that could not be installed on the exhaust nozzle of the B-1B’s engine; and faulty processors for the C-130J weather radar systems. The service seemed to keep few records of which parts they’d received restitution for; investigators noted that it took more than four months for the service to provide evidence it had received $1 million in restitution for defective B-1 exhaust nozzle flaps.

“This information was generally not readily available to Air Force deficiency reporting personnel, and they often had to obtain the evidence from other Air Force organizations, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the [Defense Contract Management Agency], and contractors,” the report said.

An official for Air Force Materiel Command told investigators that Air Force deficiency reporting guidance focuses on the investigation portion: identifying the cause of defective parts, and mitigating risks. But the contractor restitution portion leaves much to be desired. For example, the guidance does not address how to track restitution for defective parts, nor does it lay out the key roles or responsibilities for obtaining that restitution.

Other branches do it differently. Investigators noted that the Army Aviation and Missile Command does not close out its product quality deficiency reports (PQDR) until the Army receives restitution from the contractor. 

“An Air Force deficiency reporting official also suggested that keeping the PQDR open until receipt of full contractor restitution would help improve the process,” the report said.

The problems were particularly acute for the C-130J, where investigators found Air Force deficiency reporting personnel did not establish a process to track defective parts; follow Air Force guidance to establish a warranty plan and communicate that to Air Force users; or receive training on or fully understand contract warranty requirements.

“As a result, the Air Force was unable to recover $3 million for defective parts, and paid approximately $200,000 to repair defective parts under warranty, resulting in questioned costs,” the report wrote. 

The scale of these issues worried investigators “that similar deficiencies may exist with other major Air Force weapon system programs.”

DOD IG listed several recommendations for AFMC to improve the situation, including:

Find out if the Air Force can still obtain restitution for defective parts for which evidence of restitution is missing
Update technical orders to provide details on process, roles, and responsibilities for obtaining restitution for defective parts, then establish a training program for deficiency reporting personnel
Develop and implement controls and oversight for tracking contractor restitution
Require C-130J deficiency reporting personnel establish a process for tracking defective parts to make sure they are repaired or replaced by the contractor under warranty
Develop warranty guidance for C-130J deficiency reporting personnel and communicate it to the relevant parties
Provide recurring training on warranty requirements for defective parts
Review other major Air Force weapon system programs to make sure deficiency reporting rules are being followed

AFMC agreed or partially agreed to all of the recommendations, but the DOD IG said it will keep its recommendations open until “we verify that the information provided and actions taken by management fully address the recommendations.”

This report is not the first time the Air Force or the military writ large has been called out for its spare parts practices. In 2023, the Government Accountability Office said lack of Pentagon oversight for F-35 spare parts meant that the F-35 Joint Program Office has been unable to review losses worth tens of millions of dollars.

“The F-35 Joint Program Office does not track or enter these spare parts into an accountable property system of record that would enable it to capture and store real-time changes to property records,” the report stated. “Currently, the prime contractors maintain this information.” 

There is a lot of money in spare parts, which at $1.5 billion made up the biggest single item on the Air Force’s unfunded priorities list for fiscal year 2025, but some of that money may be wasted due to aging systems for forecasting parts supply needs. In January, the Air Force paid a quantum computing company $2.5 million to create a more accurate supply chain inventory management system. 

“At best, a supply chain forecast is an educated guess,” the company CEO said at the time. “At worst, it is a wild guess.”  

Investigators faulted crew members for both crashes, which included a botched parking job at Inyokern Airfield, Calif., and an accidental engine shutdown that led to an uncontrolled rapid descent and crash at Melrose Air Force Range, N.M. Neither crash appared to be systemic, a relief to supporters of the Osprey, which has been under increased scrutiny following a series of deadly mishaps in recent years.  

Inyokern Airfield 

The first incident took place Aug. 17 at Inyokern, near Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, when the copilot maneuvered too close to another CV-22 nearby, causing the rotors of the two planes to collide.

During the exercise, the squadron’s CV-22s parked on an apron at one end of a runway with sufficient space for four aircraft and enough width to allow them to maneuver, investigators found. But the parking apron was deteriorating, and ground crew assigned to marshal the aircraft reported that loose concrete and dirt was getting blown into them by the CV-22’s rotors. Rather than stand where debris might hit them, the ground crew gave up their marshaling position and put one Airman behind the aircraft and another alongside.  

Parking the aircraft, the copilot did not pull enough forward before backing up alongside a stationary CV-22. That put his aircraft on a path collide with the parked Osprey. 

Ground crew members said they signaled for the aircraft to stop, but investigators found that the ground crew failed to use standardized language or signals throughout the deployment, creating a false sense of security for aircrew. They also were not using the daylight-fluorescent wands required. The signals were missed, ignored, or not understood.

The two aircraft’s rotors collided, destroying blades on both aircraft, and when one ground crew member dove for cover from debris, the Airman sustained a shoulder injury and concussion. Total estimated damage: $2.5 million. 

Investigators cited two main causes of the accident: First, the copilot failed to ensure adequate clearance before starting to park, and second, the aircraft commander failed to tell the copilot to stop, despite feeling “uncomfortable” with how close the two aircraft were getting. 

Officials also blamed mission planners for failing to mention the “congested aircraft parking area, non- standard reverse taxi requirements, deteriorating concrete conditions, and lack of ramp illumination,” all of which were potential hazards. They also faulted an overall sense of complacency, the ground crew’s failure to use standardized signals throughout the exercise, and poor oversight by squadron and group leadership, as they did not receive a brief from the mission commander. 

Melrose Air Force Range 

Less than a week after the California incident, a 20th Special Operations Squadron flight engineer unknowingly caused his Osprey to crash in New Mexico when a cable connecting a battery pack to his night vision goggles got looped around a lever and inadvertently switched off one engine. 

The Osprey slammed into the ground, causing $2 million in damage. The incident occurred at Melrose Air Force Range, N.M., during nighttime training on Aug. 22, 2023. The flight engineer “struck his head” upon impact and was treated at a local hospital, but there were no other injuries. 

According to the accident investigation report, the Osprey crew was on a training sortie for the 27th Special Operations Wing and flight engineers had just completed aerial gunnery training. The Osprey was hovering about 190 feet above the ground, and the aircraft commander and copilot were preparing to switch from hover to forward flight. 

As they retracted the landing gear, the flight engineer entered the cockpit “with significant slack” in his night vision goggle battery pack cable, the report notes. Sitting down in the designated flight engineer seat, he did not notice his cable get wrapped around the right engine control lever, pulling it from “FLY” to “OFF.” 

With the engine shut down, the aircraft lost the necessary power to maintain a hover and began plunging toward the ground at up to 1,500 feet per minute. The copilot tried to command full power from the aircraft, but the single engine could not generate enough lift. 

The aircraft commander was able to pull the nose up to arrest the aircraft’s forward speed and slow the descent rate slowed to 800 feet per minute, but in just 11 seconds the Osprey struck the ground at a speed of around 40 knots. When the aircraft bounced—the looped battery pack cable pulled in the opposite direction, this time shifting the lever back to “FLY.” After a second, harder landing, the CV-22 slid about 360 feet.  

“The antennae, lights, nose landing gear doors, and the Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) turret positioned on the bottom of the [aircraft] were crushed, destroyed, and spread along the skid path,” the report states. 

The FLIR turret “provides a thermal image that enables a pilot to take-off, navigate at low altitudes and land in total darkness,” the report added. 

The flight engineer whose cable turned the engine off was unrestrained during the crash, his head and neck “yanked backwards to the extreme of flexion and extension” by the battery cable, until it snapped, slamming his face into the center display. 

The engineer was transported to a local hospital out of concern that he had suffered a concussion and released early the next morning. 

Air Force investigators determined the main cause of the crash was the battery pack cable, but also faulted the aircraft commander for failing to protect the engine control levers, even though other experienced CV-22 aviators knew that pilots often guard the levers when anyone in the cockpit is getting in a seat while in flight. 

On top of that, the report faulted the aircrew’s inattentiveness during a critical phase of flight and lack of real-time risk assessment. The flight engineer should not have tried or been allowed to get into the seat while the aircraft was transitioning from hover to forward flight, and the aircraft commander could have noted the wind conditions while hovering—by moving the aircraft away from a tailwind, investigators said, the aviators could have been able to recover once the mishap began. 

Finally, the investigation found a lack of clear procedural guidance for how to deal with excess cable from night vision goggles, leading to the slack on the flight engineer’s cable. 

“As threats have evolved, NATO remains as unified as ever,” Kendall said in a release.

Wrapping up his tour in Poland earlier this week, Kendall visited Łask Air Base’s 52nd Operations Group, Detachment 1 to spotlight the unit’s role in securing NATO’s eastern flank and deterring threats. Part of the 52nd Fighter Wing stationed in Germany, the detachment manages U.S. Air Force aircraft rotations to Poland, boosting joint operations with the Polish Air Force. The unit represents the first permanent presence of U.S. forces in the nation, a move made last year in response to escalating regional tensions related to Russia’s conflict with Ukraine.

Poland frequently collaborates with U.S. fighters for joint training and hosts exercises over its airspace. Earlier this month, Poland hosted a U.S. Air Force F-35 exercise involving the 48th Fighter Wing from Royal Air Force Lakenheath, U.K., along with KC-135 Stratotankers.

Poland is also set to be the first Eastern European country to receive F-35A fighters in 2026. Earlier this week, the country’s first Lightning II was unveiled to defense leaders at Lockheed Martin’s production facility in Texas.

“We are joining a strong coalition of fifth generation fighters across Europe, bolstering air superiority through allied deterrence,” Maj. Gen. Ireneusz Nowak, Inspector of Polish Air Force, said in a release.

Poland’s first F-35 aircraft, AZ-01, named “Husarz” in honor of the country’s historic cavalry unit, will be delivered in December. This aircraft will be stationed at Ebbing Air National Guard Base, Arkansas, for pilot training until 2026.

Kendall’s itinerary also included a stop in Lithuania, where he met with the Minister of National Defense and the country’s military leaders.

At last month’s NATO summit in Washington, leaders unveiled plans to enhance the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) system by rotating the model across the Eastern Flank, aimed at fortifying defense across land, air, maritime, cyber in Poland, Lithuania, Romania, and Bulgaria.

“The NATO alliance is the rock-solid cornerstone to security, not only in Lithuania, but also the Baltics and across all of NATO,” Kendall said in a release. “It is crucial to peace and stability that we continue to work together to deter our adversaries in the region.”

NATO’s air policing mission has been ongoing for the Baltic nations—Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia—since they joined the alliance in 2004. This effort has intensified since Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with the U.S. deploying fourth and fifth-generation fighters to the region. During his trip, Kendall visited the three nations to emphasize regional defense cooperation.

“The Baltic Air Policing mission is an essential activity to maintain peace and security not only for Estonia, but throughout NATO,” said Kendall.

During his trip, Kendall also visited Finland and Sweden, relatively new NATO members. NATO is working to establish a presence in Finland and fully integrate both Finland and Sweden into NATO plans, forces, and command structures to leverage their capabilities.

Finland shares more than 800 miles of border with Russia. Last month, two Russian fighters intercepted two B-52 Stratofortresses over the Barents Sea in the Arctic. The bombers flew through Finnish airspace for the first time before landing in Romania to start their first-ever operational deployment from that country. The strategic bombers crossed Norway before flying over Lapland, Finland’s northernmost region that borders Russia, Sweden, and Norway.

Northrop first introduced Model 437 as a concept three years ago, touting it as a possible answer to the Air Force’s “loyal wingman” program—now called CCA—as well as a U.K. requirement for an attritable escort for F-35s. Since then, however, it has been tight-lipped about the project, and in announcing the aircraft’s first flight made no mention of CCA.

“The Model 437 began as a conceptual design, based on the Model 401, exploring a multi-mission, low-cost, attritable aircraft,” Northrop said in its release. The Model 437 is “a crewed variant of the original concept, powered by a single Pratt & Whitney 535 engine, with approximately 3,400 pounds of thrust.” After envelope expansion, it will have a range of approximately 3,000 nautical miles and endurance of six hours, Northrop said.

The company added that the aircraft can carry a payload of up to 2,000 pounds “in multiple locations” including two AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs).

In its own release, Scaled said the Model 437 “leveraged extensive experience in rapid design, fabrication, and test of experimental aircraft.” In this case, it involved a “clean-sheet aircraft design, aerodynamic and structural analysis, fuselage and empennage fabrication, aircraft assembly, systems integration, and ground and flight test execution.” It described the first flight as “uneventful.”

Northrop also touted the digital framework underlying the Model 437—which carried a pilot on its first flight—as a product of collaboration between “the customer and supplier users.” Together, they developed, analyzed, built, and tested the wings of the aircraft, the company said. Northrop was not immediately able to explain why the aircraft is crewed, although industry officials have suggested the pilot could be there to be a hands-off safety supervisor as the jet tests out various autonomous flight programs.

“The Digital Pathfinder project demonstrated how the company’s fully digital engineering ecosystem reduces engineering rework, accelerates schedule and reduces costs, offering advantages to customers on future aircraft programs,” Northrop said. It employs “real world experience gained on programs like the B-21 Raider,” the Air Force’s new stealth bomber.

Colin Miller, vice president of Northrop’s aeronautics systems, said the company is working to “continuously improve” its digital tools and capabilities.

“This project demonstrates how high-fidelity models within our digital ecosystem serve as a single source of truth to streamline testing and certification on future aircraft, significantly saving cost and time for our customer,” Miller said.

Presumably referring to the Model 437, the company said digital methods “cut engineering rework and redesign to less than one percent, compared to the 15-20 percent experienced using traditional methods.” In the future, these methods could “significantly reduce the workload required to determine airworthiness, offering further cost and schedule savings opportunities.”

Northrop says Model 437 measures 41 feet by 41 feet and has a 10,000 pound maximum takeoff weight. It can accommodate a single pilot and fly at 25,000 feet.

Northrop said the aircraft also pioneers a new additive manufacturing process which produced “a titanium structural bracket using plasma arc energy deposition.” Northrop said it believes this method of forming a titanium part is a first in the defense industry. The method reduces the need for hard tooling, accelerating the prototyping process, while “improving first-time quality.”

The digital ecosystem used for the Vanguard “connected engineers, customers, and stakeholders in a virtual environment, allowing them to proactively foresee and solve the types of problems that typically plague acquisition programs up front and early—greatly improving program performance,” Northrop said.

In a press conference in 2021, Northrop officials posited a cost for the Model 437 of $5 million to $6 million per copy if it was put into series production. Company officials said the aircraft could achieve a speed of .85 Mach, making it capable of keeping up with F-35s enroute to a target, and said it would need less than 3,000 feet to take off.

The Air Force has adjusted its thinking on the CCA in the last few years, and now envisions the aircraft as performing escort functions for fighters but also carrying out independent missions. The first mission the Air Force plans for CCAs is as an air-to-air combat platform, likely carrying additional missiles that can be targeted by crewed fighters, but also able to select and fire air-to-air missiles autonomously.  

Northrop was not chosen for the first increment of CCA—which went to Anduril, with its “Fury” aircraft, and General Atomics, with a variant of its XQ-67A Off Board Sensor System—but the company is competing for the CCA Increment 2, for which a downselect could come as early as 2026.  

The JPO and Lockheed “have reached an agreement for the acceptance and delivery” of TR-3-enabled aircraft “with robust training capability,” a program spokesperson said. He said the JPO and Lockheed have agreed to “terms and conditions” for deliveries and software releases but did not elaborate.

As many as 100 F-35s had been in storage for up to a year before deliveries resumed in mid-July. They had been completed but not delivered because the TR-3 upgrade—processors, displays, and other improvements—has not been fully tested. To get deliveries moving again, the F-35 partners agreed early in the summer to accept a “truncated” version of the TR-3 software, and JPO director Lt. Gen. Michael Schmidt determined the software was safe for flight in July.

The TR-3 is the basis for the F-35’s Block 4 upgrade, which includes more than 80 improvements chiefly having to do with electronic warfare, navigation and communications, and weapons.

The spokesperson was not immediately able to say what functions the new software will permit, but Lockheed CEO Jim Taiclet said on an earnings call in April that the truncated software will mean the jets can “get … in the hands of squadron, wing, and regional commanders so that they can start training their pilots on them and training their maintenance organizations, and also get the base infrastructure, spare parts, tools, everything else.” He said the jets “could be deployed into actual combat operations” if called on.

“In the statement we sent out in July,” the JPO spokesperson said, “we explained that the TR-3 aircraft initially being delivered had ‘initial training capability,’ and that ‘more robust combat training capability’ would be delivered in August. The ‘more robust combat training capability’ is now being delivered.”

As part of the agreement, the JPO will withhold a portion of final aircraft delivery payments until “TR-3 combat capability is qualified and delivered.” That amount will be about $5 million per aircraft, the spokesperson said. An F-35 costs about $82 million each, according to the latest contract.

The full TR-3 software package is still not expected to be fielded until early next year.

In addition, the JPO said Lockheed and its F-35 partners are “making significant investments in development labs and digital infrastructure that benefit the F-35 enterprise’s speed and agility in fielding [new] capabilities” for the fighter.

The announcement comes a day after Lockheed received F-35 contracts valued at just over $5 billion covering a range of F-35-related items such a simulators and training devices, sustainment, engineering, materiel support supplies, repair capabilities and equipment for depots.

“During the air battle, the F-16 aircraft demonstrated their high efficiency,” Ukraine’s General Staff said in a statement. The Ukrainian Air Force said Moonfish helped down three cruise missiles and one drone on Aug. 26—his final mission.

“During the approach to the next target, contact with one of the aircraft was lost,” the General Staff said.

On Aug. 26, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy touted the effectiveness of the F-16s in their first contact with enemy targets but made no mention of any losses to aircraft or pilots.

It is unclear what caused the crash. The Ukrainian military said it is investigating. A member of the Ukrainian parliament, Marina Bezuhla, said the incident may have been a case of friendly fire. Moonfish’s F-16 was likely shot down by another American-made weapon, a Patriot surface-to-air missile system, “due to a lack of coordination between units,” Bezuhla wrote on social media. No evidence has been presented for that theory so far.

A memorial for Mes was held on Aug. 29.

“We lost a reliable friend and a strong warrior,” the Ukrainian Air Force said in a statement. A pair of MiG-29s flew over the ceremony. Mes was posthumously promoted to colonel.

“F-16 fighters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were used together with anti-aircraft missile units during the repulse of a missile attack by the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine,” the General Staff statement said. It said a committee was investigating the crash.

Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh declined to provide details of the crash and said the U.S. was not involved in the crash probe.

“The United States has not been asked to participate in any type of investigation to look into this incident,” Singh said. “Broadly speaking, combat aviation is incredibly complex, and we’ve been very proud to train some of the pilots here in the United States. … Every day that they fly those aircraft, these are brave men and women going up there to defend their skies and to defend their country.”

Moonfish is the second high-profile Ukrainian pilot who advocated for Ukraine to get F-16s to be killed. Andriy “Juice” Pilshchykov and two other pilots were killed in an accident involving trainer aircraft in 2023. Moonfish and Juice appeared together in the media, including in the United States, and lobbied Congress to pressure the Biden administration to authorize the transfer of F-16s.

Moonfish “was the very first trained F-16 pilot for Ukraine and carried that pride even into his death,” wrote former Rep. Adam Kinzinger (R-Ill.), who met with the two pilots in 2022.

“His skills as a pilot were unmatched, his instincts razor-sharp,” Kinzinger added. “He had a natural talent for flying, but it was his heart that set him apart. Moonfish flew not just for victory, but for justice—for the children of Ukraine, for the future of his nation.”

The Ukrainian Air Force, also known as the PS ZSU, also celebrated the pilot.

“Oleksiy saved Ukrainians from deadly Russian missiles, unfortunately at the cost of his own life,” the PS ZSU said. “Oleksiy Mes was a strong and loyal soldier, a high-class pilot, a leader on earth and in the sky, a good friend, a loving son, father, husband, and patriot of his country.”

Airpower experts and U.S. officials have cautioned that Ukraine’s second-hand F-16s, publicly unveiled Aug. 4, will not provide Kyiv with air superiority in the near term. The fighters have been spotted carrying AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, and the U.S. has already provided the Ukrainian Air Force with JDAM Extended Range guided bombs and HARM anti-radiation missiles for its legacy fleet of MiGs and Sukhoi jets.

The F-16 just celebrated its 50th birthday. The venerable, multirole fourth-generation fighter has been heavily upgraded over the years and is still in production. Denmark and the Netherlands are donating Ukraine’s first jets, and Norway and Belgium have also promised to provide Ukraine with F-16s—some 80 total aircraft. The U.S. is not providing Ukraine with any Vipers, but the U.S. Air Force’s 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing recently announced that it helped enhance the electronic warfare capabilities of the foreign jets Ukraine is receiving and plans to continue providing support.

Zelenskyy has said Ukraine needs more F-16s and permission to engage targets in Russia to protect Ukraine’s skies.